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The Botnet Threat
 Tool of choice for Internet criminals
 Useful for many purposes:
▫ Spam
▫ DDoS
▫ Fast Flux
 Extremely powerful
 Simple to deploy and maintain
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The Botnet Threat
 Network of compromised computers
 Remotely operated by botmaster
 Command and control channel (C&C)
▫ IRC: classic, Agobot
▫ HTTP: more stealthy, Bobax
▫ P2P: robust, Storm worm
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Botnet Counter Measures
 Host-based
▫ Anti-virus software
▫ Relies on binary signature database (polymorphism)
▫ Host installation required
 Network-based
▫ Intrusion detection
▫ No requirements from end-user
▫ Relies on (hand-crafted) network signatures
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Goal of our Work
 Network-based botnet detection
▫ Deployed on gateway
▫ Transparent to the user
 Automatically generated signatures
▫ No costly work has to be performed by human experts
▫ Signatures for new botnets can be added easily
 C&C protocol agnostic
▫ Signatures can be generated regardless of C&C protocol
▫ No expert knowledge about a specific botnet is required
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Detection Models
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Detection Models
 Characterisation of bot traffic using two phases
▫ Phase 1: Bot receives command
▫ Phase 2: Bot executes command
 Both phases are visible in network traffic
 Example:
▫ Phase 1 (command): string „advscan“ is transmitted to host X
▫ Phase 2 (response): X transmits many SYN packets to 
different recipients
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Detection Models
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Generating Detection Models
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Generating Detection Models - Overview
 Input: Network traces of similar bot programs
 Find sudden changes in the bot‘s network behavior
 These changes are most likely due to a previously 
received command!
 Characterize traffic content before the change -> 
command model (phase 1)
 Characterize network behavior after the change -> 
response model (phase 2)
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Obtaining Bot Network Traces
 Assemble a „bot family“
▫ Set of similar sample bot programs
▫ Similar C&C mechanism
▫ Not necessarily from same botnet
 Execute samples in a controlled environment
▫ Internet access open, so C&C communication works
▫ Run-time: several days
▫ Goal: collect command/reponse pairs
International Secure Systems Lab
Vienna University of Technology
SIDAR Graduierten-Workshop über Reaktive Sicherheit 2009
Locating Bot Behavior Changes
 Identify points in time where a sudden change of the 
bot‘s network behavior has occurred
 Assumption
▫ Change is due to a previously received command
▫ New network behavior is a manifestation of a bot response
▫ Command (data that is directly related to the bot‘s action) was 
received within a restricted time interval before the change
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Locating Bot Behavior Changes
 Time-series
 Partition into discretization intervals of equal length
 Set of low-level network features each interval is 
inspected for:
▫ Number of packets
▫ Cumulative size of packets
▫ Number of different IPs contacted
▫ Number of different ports contacted
▫ Number of non-ASCII bytes in payload
▫ Number of UDP packets
▫ Number of HTTP packets (Port 80)
▫ Number of SMTP packets (Port 25)
International Secure Systems Lab
Vienna University of Technology
SIDAR Graduierten-Workshop über Reaktive Sicherheit 2009
Locating Bot Behavior Changes
 Change point detection
 Modified variant of CUSUM algorithm
 We know the interesting points in time now!
  command in traffic before
  response in traffic after
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Response Model (Phase 2)
 Generalisation steps:
1. Description of network behavior in one discretization interval
2. Description of network behavior of the discretization intervals 
that form one bot response
3. Description of a class of bot responses
 We already have 1.  network features
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Response Model (Phase 2)
 Generalization to describe sequence of discretization 
intervals that form one bot response
 Each period between two detected change points 
exhibits consistent bot network behavior
 This consistent behavior represents one bot response
 Behavior profile: average values of the network 
features per discretization interval
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Response Model (Phase 2)
 Generalization to describe a class of bot responses
 Clustering of similar bot responses based on behavior 
profiles
 Each cluster represents one type of bot behavior
 The response model (phase 2) is the average of all 
behavior profiles of a cluster
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Command Model (Phase 1)
 We have response models, now what are the 
corresponding command models?
 Reuse clusters of similar bot responses
 Inspect traffic that precedes responses in same cluster
 Extract similarities
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Command Model (Phase 1)
 Find token sequences in the network traffic that are 
characteristic for triggering the observed response
 Tokens can consist of:
▫ the command itself
▫ frequently used parameters
▫ artefacts from the surrounding C&C protocol
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Detection Model Summary
 Phase 1 – command
▫ Token  sequence
▫ Network content that is characteristic to show up before a 
certain bot response begins
 Phase 2 – response
▫ Description of the response using network features
▫ Network-level characterization of a type of bot response
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Evaluation
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Evaluation
 Generated detection models for
▫ various IRC bots
▫ Bobax
▫ Storm worm
 Translated them into Bro NIDS policy script
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Example
signature irc {
dst-ip == local_nets
payload /.* PRIVMSG #.* :\.asc .*5 0 .*/
}
#DIFFERENT IPS > 20
(within 50 seconds)
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Evaluation – Detection Performance
 Evaluation of our generated signatures using cross-
validation on bot network traces
 Detection rate: 88%
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Evaluation - Preciseness
 Real-world deployment on well maintained networks
 No bot infections expected
 Students residential homes network
▫ /21 range, densely populated
▫ observation period: 55 days
▫ no false positives
 University network (/20, 3 months)
▫ /20 range, medium populated
▫ observation period: 102 days
▫ only 11 IPs falsely raised an alert
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Conclusion
 2 Phases: Command/Response
 Our system produces botnet detection models
▫ for network-based detection
▫ without expert knowledge about specific botnets
▫ automatically
 Deployment on gateway, end-user not involved
 Effective detection with few false positives
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Publication
This work is presented also at ESORICS 2009.
„Automatically Generating Models for Botnet Detection“
Check out the paper at http://www.iseclab.org
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Questions?
Thank you for your attention! 
I'd be happy to answer all of your questions!
